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The new millennium perspectives on science and 
technology and its role in India’s foreign policy can be 
ascertained from a variety of instances. Former Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh, during his visit to the US in September 
2000 talked about the ‘repositioning’ of India in regional and 
world affairs. In January 2015, during his address to the Indian 
Science Congress, Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked about 
a growing trend of international collaboration in research 
and development that India should be able to take advantage 
of. It was primarily for this reason that PM Modi had placed 
science and technology at the forefront of India’s diplomatic 
engagement. The fact that this address was made at the Indian 
Science Congress and not at a meeting of Indian ambassadors 
was in itself significant. Besides, the recent discourse in 
newspapers on India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) has been led by the Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA), rather than by the country’s scientific community. 
This substantive involvement is indicative of the noticeable 
diffusion of science and technology into India’s foreign policy-
making. 
The geopolitical ‘repositioning’ mentioned by PM 
Manmohan Singh is possible only if a significant part of 
India’s S&T and related military capabilities (capabilities that 
are dual-use in a dual-usable environment) are grown and 
shaped to be globally deployable as instruments for India to 
become one of the top five energy producing countries with 
co-responsibilities for climate  stewardship; one of the eight 
nuclear powers, and one of the six space powers that are 
ASAT-capable. Currently, there is no NPT-style regime for 
space. Nevertheless, the conduct of the ASAT test prior to 
an arbitrary date could become the fiducial event for a space 
regime that could segregate the ‘space-haves’ from the ‘have-
nots’. Also, the country’s S&T and military capabilities will 
need to be grown to a size and capability so as to be make it 
inevitable that India becomes a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, co-responsible with the other members, for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.
A morphological distinction needs to be recognised 
between international collaborations in scientific and 
technological fields and S&T-in-foreign policy. While 
international collaborations in S&T usually take place between 
laboratories across different countries, the incorporation of 
S&T in foreign policy has wider connotations. Thus, when the 
findings of science or the potential use of technology could 
have ramifications for international relations beyond the ‘S’ or 
‘T’ themselves, the pursuit of the ‘S’ or the use/denial-of-use of 
the ‘T’ influence are influenced  by foreign policy.
S&T becomes an item of diplomatic engagement when 
a quid pro quo is negotiated for India in return for India’s 
participation as a state, as distinct from being an international 
activity of the scientific community. It is necessary to make 
such a distinction because when participating as a state, foreign 
policy takes the ‘pole position’, so-to-speak, at the front-end 
of negotiations. Whereas, when the collaborative arrangements 
are settled between scientific communities, the primary 
driver of the relationship are the scientists themselves (A ‘no 
objection’ kind of approval from the MEA checks that there 
are no UN-mandated restrictions applicable to transactions 
envisaged in the collaboration. Any applicable restraints under 
Indian Export Control regulations always apply).
However, scientific engagements of the above kind are 
different from the use of S&T in diplomatic engagement 
which involves the proactive nature of the state using its S&T 
advantages. These advantages maybe locational, such as the 
UN-sponsored Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station 
(TERLS) at the Magnetic Equator or the Laser Interferometer 
Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) experiment; they may 
be epidemiological, such as the WHO sponsored vaccine trials; 
they may also be technological, which include a contribution 
to sub-systems, such as the International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor (ITER) project in France or the mirror 
actuators for the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) in Hawaii. 
Besides these, the reciprocal use of facilities such as those 
between Giant Meter-wave Radio Telescope (GMRT), in 
Khodad, near Pune, India and Arecibo in Puerto Rico, and the 
non-reciprocal offer for the use of unique Indian facilities such 
as the South Asian Satellite (SAS), or the infrared telescope 
in Ladakh are some other modes of scientific collaboration 
that carry foreign policy advantages. S&T collaborations and 
exchanges are thus a form of the country’s ‘gentle power’.
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The Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory 
experiment is a case that highlights the exchange between 
India’s foreign policy and S&T. LIGO is an international 
collaborative project that uses to foreign policy advantage 
India’s location at the opposite end of the globe from the other 
LIGO detector in the uS. It is an expensive project whose cost 
to India may well about go up to INR 2,000 crore by the time 
the facility is commissioned. 
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is funding the 
Indian component of LIGO. While there is no doubt that it has 
helped India garner foreign policy advantage, there are many 
significant voices in India’s scientific community that have 
questioned the worthwhileness of LIGO even from a purely 
scientific point of view. Occasionally, the MEA drives some 
collaborations, notwithstanding a lack of domestic consensus 
on the scientific merits of the investments. for example, in 
2016 India became an associate member of the CERN group. 
The associate membership would cost India approximately 
INR 78 crore annually though it still would not have voting 
rights on decisions of the Council. The DAE was not keen 
because India already had time-access to conduct experiments 
on the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) by virtue of India’s 
association with CERNthat goes back decades and with an 
active involvement in the construction of the LHC, in the areas 
of design, development and supply of accelerator components/
systems and its commissioning, and software development and 
deployment in the machine. Associate membership of CERN 
therefore had nothing very tangible to add. The decision to 
become a member was evidently taken in view of Pakistan’s 
associate membership of CERN. Pakistan gave itself bragging 
rights -- ‘first Asian country’. India’s re-visit of its earlier 
policy was, in this case, clearly foreign-policy driven.
As human threats to the global commons become ever 
more severe, global diplomatic negotiations over treaty-
based national actions to mitigate them become increasingly 
underpinned by a common transnational appreciation of the 
underlying science. Equally, unilateral withdrawals from such 
treaties signify a lack of national appreciation of the underlying 
scientific drivers, leading to a breakdown of international 
diplomatic engagement. 
There are two hardly-known Indian traces to international 
science-informed diplomatic negotiations. These include 
the Kothari-Krishnan-Parthasarathy report on the Effects of 
Nuclear Explosions, which subsequently formed the scientific 
foundation for the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the 
Kulkarni-Ramanathan papers from the late 1940s on the 
vertical transport of Ozone in the atmosphere which resulted in 
the Ozone-CfC chemistry that was fundamental to the framing 
of the Montreal Protocol. 
High-technology engagements have dominated the 
exchange between S&T and foreign policy. Although the 
‘height of a technology’ is really only an anthropological 
concept! Technologies that are controlled in respect of their 
international trade for foreign policy or national security 
reasons are referred to as ‘high technology’. The development 
of high technology and engagement in this sector have 
transformed India’s position from being a ‘discriminatee’ 
after the conduct of the 1974 nuclear test, to the status 
of a ‘participant discriminator’ at the threshold of NSG 
membership, supported by the very countries that sanctioned it 
severely in 1974. India’s Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle 
(ASLV) was launched in 1987 and this event triggered the 
formation of the MTCR, of which technology-denial regime 
India became a target. However, with the granting of MTCR 
membership in 2016, India has now become a participant-
discriminator.
India was aware that to obtain high-technologies 
from abroad it was important to become a full member of 
international technology control regimes, as well as design 
a sound system domestically for a regulated control of full 
supply chain management from the source to the end-user. 
This was done to prevent a horizontal leakage of technology. 
Over the last two decades, Indian export control has evolved. 
In 1993, the first group was set up under the Department of 
Science and Technology, and by 2000, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) Act was passed. As per the requirements 
under chapter 7 of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 
the Indian parliament passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) Act in 2005. In 2013, India began a process of selective 
concordance with the regime lists, and by 2014, India had a 
wide extant-member support for India’smembership of export 
control regimes, including the NSG. Regulations notified under 
Indian laws pertaining to ‘dual-use’ and military materials 
and technology whose export is controlled by India were thus 
designed to advance India’s foreign policy goals through trade 
in high-technology.
A data-supported article in the prestigious international 
scientific journal Nature published on 18 October 2012 draws 
attention to a very significant shift that is taking place in the 
geography of science. The article notes: “Networks of research 
collaboration are expanding in every region of the globe. 
US and Europe, the established science superpowers, have 
dominated the research world since 1945. yet this Atlantic 
axis is unlikely to be the main focus of research by 2045, or 
perhaps even by 2020.” This quote is indicative of a science 
‘re-balance’ to Asia. It is important to note the use of terms 
such as ‘science superpowers’ and ‘Atlantic axis’ which are 
commonly used in diplomatic parlance. However, they are not 
regularly used in the world of science.
As India enlarges its ‘scientific presence’ in more S&T 
fields, more entities from different countries with a similar 
‘scientific presence’ will seek to collaborate with the state and 
non-state institutions of the country. As India’s technological 
capabilities rise ‘higher’, in part through such collaborations 
themselves (a process known as ‘boot-strapping’), the 
implications of these collaborations will increasingly lie at the 
confluence of S&T, foreign policy and national security.
